[FORECAST] Dismantled or Displaced? Cambodia’s Scam-Compound Crackdown by 2030?
Cambodia says it sealed off ~190 scam sites. 🧨 Now the real question: dismantled or displaced? 🧱🚚 Our forecast uses grown-up metrics (convictions + asset denial + independent compound counts).
TL;DR
This is a follow-on post to an original piece we published Kill the Lights, Fire Up Starlink: Scam Compounds Slide South
H/T to those of you working this ongoing mess- these numbers aren't to dissuade you, but provide more context to the decision makers- maybe we can make the world a little safer.
We apprecate you!
Question
Will Cambodia achieve a complete, durable crackdown on scam organizations operating within its borders (border zones + urban centers), meaning the ecosystem is dismantled rather than displaced, by 2030-12-31?
Executive Forecast
10% reflects a high bar: “complete crackdown” requires durable nationwide suppression plus organizer-level prosecutions and asset denial, not periodic raids and displacement. The biggest hinge is whether Cambodia’s enforcement turns structurally toward dismantling protection and money-laundering enablers (payments/casinos/real estate) under sustained international pressure. The cleanest leading indicator is independent mapping showing a year-long collapse in major-compound prevalence across all major hotspots.
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Forecast Card
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Question: Will Cambodia achieve a complete, durable crackdown on scam organizations operating within its borders (border zones + urban centers), meaning the ecosystem is dismantled rather than displaced, by 2030-12-31?
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Resolution Criteria (Quantified, auditable): YES if all conditions below are met by 2030-12-31, using the scoring rubric and data sources listed here.
- Hub-status downgrade: At least two independent authoritative assessments (e.g., UN/IGO + major investigative/monitoring org) state Cambodia is no longer a major regional hub for scam-compound operations and do not identify any Cambodian hotspot as among the region’s primary concentration areas.
- Major-compound prevalence threshold: For 12 consecutive months ending on or before 2030-12-31, open-source mapping/monitoring indicates Cambodia has ≤10 “major scam compounds” nationwide and ≤2 per hotspot province.
- Major scam compound (operational definition): a site credibly assessed to host ≥50 scam workers or to have industrial-scale infrastructure (guards, controlled dorms, rows of devices) or repeated victim-escape / raid documentation consistent with forced scamming.
- Hotspot provinces/cities (tracking set): Preah Sihanouk (Sihanoukville), Banteay Meanchey (Poipet/OSmach), Svay Rieng (Bavet), Phnom Penh, Koh Kong, Pursat. (Adjustable if new hotspots emerge.)
- Disruption of enabling ecosystem (not just raids): Cambodia shows sustained action against upper-tier facilitators, meeting both:
- Prosecutions: ≥20 organizer/facilitator convictions (owners, financiers, senior managers, corrupt protectors, trafficking organizers) with custodial sentences ≥5 years (or equivalent under Cambodian law) and at least 5 convictions involving public officials for protection/collusion-related offenses; and
- Asset denial: ≥USD 100M equivalent in cumulative, publicly reported asset freezes/seizures/forfeitures linked to scam-compound or scam-laundering cases between 2027–2030 (sum across years), evidenced in official reporting or court orders.
- Trafficking/forced-scamming pressure reduction (proxy metric): For calendar years 2029 and 2030, credible reporting shows <500 identified victims/year rescued/escaped from scam-compound forced scamming in Cambodia (recognizing undercount risk; this is a directional, not absolute, proxy).
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Horizon: 2030-12-31 (America/New_York)
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Probability (Now): 10% | Log-odds: -2.20
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Confidence in Inputs: Medium (criteria are now more measurable; primary Cambodian judicial/AML data availability remains a constraint)
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Base Rate (Tightened): 8% from a similarity-weighted reference class of jurisdictions facing industrial-scale scam-compound ecosystems where enforcement pressure often yields relocation/fragmentation rather than elimination (table below; anchored to GI-TOC and INTERPOL reporting on persistence and mobility).
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Reference Class Table (Auditable, short)
Outcome being scored: “Durable domestic suppression of industrial-scale scam compounds (not merely displacement) within ~5–8 years of becoming a prominent hub / receiving major crackdown attention.”
| Case (jurisdiction) | Ecosystem type (comparable?) | Crackdown pressure present? | Observed outcome (as of 2024–2025 reporting) | Time-to-suppression | Scored success? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cambodia | Casino/SEZ-adjacent compounds; border + coastal hubs | Yes (raids + intl pressure) | Persistent / adaptive; continued hotspot activity reported | >5 yrs | No |
| Laos (GTSEZ/Bokeo) | SEZ enclave with reported scam compounds | Intermittent | Persistent; enforcement uncertain; enclave dynamics | >5 yrs | No |
| Myanmar (Myawaddy/Shwe Kokko) | Border enclave + armed-group protection | Yes (power cuts/pressure) | Persistent / adaptive under armed protection | >5 yrs | No |
| Philippines (POGO-linked compounds e.g., Bamban) | Compounds linked to offshore gambling/scams | Yes (raids/bans) | Partial disruption; displacement risk regionally | ~3–6 yrs | No (for “complete”) |
| China (domestic) | Telecom-fraud/call-center suppression domestically; displacement abroad noted | Strong | Domestic suppression appears substantially effective, but exports problem | ~5–8 yrs | Partial (counted as 0.5) |
How this maps to an 8% base rate (explicit):
- Empirical score: 0.5 “success-equivalent” / 5 cases ≈ 10%.
- Similarity downweight for Cambodia: China is materially less comparable (state capacity/rule-of-law enforcement intensity). Applying a conservative ~0.7 weight to the 4 “Cambodia-like” cases (all failures) and ~0.3 weight to China’s partial success yields an effective base rate pulled down to ~8%.
- This is intentionally conservative: it avoids “0%” while reflecting that Cambodia’s closest analogs in the Mekong scam-compound pattern have not shown full elimination in the available reporting period.
Bayesian Update (Base → Now, auditably)
- Start: Base rate 8% (log-odds -2.44).
- + intl financial pressure & targeting of enabling nodes (OFAC + FinCEN actions; NBC license revocation referenced): +0.25 log-odds.
- - entrenched protection + adaptation/relocation dynamics (GI-TOC/INTERPOL): -0.05 log-odds (small here because this is partly “in” the base rate already).
- Posterior: log-odds ≈ -2.24 → ~9.6%, rounded to 10%.
